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Each year influenza viruses cause epidemics somewhere in the world and
an annual average of more than 20,000 deaths in the United States. New
strains of the virus continually evolve, causing remarkable variability in the
intensity and severity of illness. Periodically, but unpredictably, a major
genetic change in the virus results in a strain that can cause widespread
disease and death. Three such global epidemics—called pandemics—
occurred in the 20th century. The worst occurred in 1918 and killed more
than 20 million people worldwide. Recent books and media attention have
recounted the devastation of this pandemic and noted the prospect of a
similar influenza outbreak.
In recent years, public health experts have raised concerns about the
ability of the nation’s public health system to detect and respond to
emerging infectious disease threats, such as pandemic influenza. The
response effort would need to include the ability to quickly produce and
distribute a vaccine and antiviral drugs effective against the pandemic
strain, as well as the ability to vaccinate or treat the population against
pneumonia and its complications, which are most often the actual cause of
death. You asked us to examine (1) the capability to develop and produce a
vaccine to protect the nation from a pandemic influenza virus, (2) the
capability to use other measures, such as antiviral drugs and pneumococcal
vaccine, to help protect or treat people exposed to a pandemic virus, and
(3) the status of federal and state plans to address the purchase,
distribution, and administration of vaccines and antiviral drugs in a
pandemic.
To address issues related to the production and use of vaccines and
antiviral drugs, we interviewed officials and reviewed influenza-related
documents from three Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
agencies—the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Institutes of HealthGAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
(NIH), as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs. We also interviewed
private sector representatives from the 4 manufacturers producing
influenza vaccine for the United States, 4 of 12 manufacturers of antiviral
drugs, and various professional associations representing distributors and
administrators of vaccines and drugs. To gather information on federal and
state influenza pandemic planning efforts, we also interviewed HHS
officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation, Office of Emergency Planning, and National Vaccine Program
Office, and officials in a judgmental sample of 11 of 29 states that either
have drafted a plan or have begun to draft one. Although states have a lead
role for public health response in the United States, state programs vary
widely. The results from our analysis of state efforts are illustrative and
cannot be generalized to other states. We conducted our work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards from
April to September 2000.
Results in Brief The results of our review show that vaccines, which are considered the
first line of defense to prevent or reduce influenza-related illness and death,
may be unavailable, in short supply, or ineffective for certain portions of
the population during the first wave of a pandemic. Experience has shown
that the vaccine production cycle takes at least 6 to 8 months after a virus
strain has been identified. However, new strains of influenza virus
sometimes appear too late to be included in the yearly influenza vaccine
production for the United States. Also, vaccines for some influenza strains
have been difficult to mass-produce, causing further delay. Even if
sufficient quantities of the vaccine are produced in time, studies show that
it is uncertain how well this can help prevent or control the spread of a
pandemic influenza virus. Vaccines against various strains differ in their
ability to produce antibodies to neutralize the virus, and each person’s
immune system may respond somewhat differently. Limited studies have
shown that when the vaccine provides a good antibody response to the
virus, approximately 70 to 90 percent of healthy young adults may be
protected from influenza. This protection drops to about 30 to 40 percent
for the elderly and those suffering from chronic illness or disease.
Antiviral drugs and vaccines against pneumonia are expected to be in short
supply if a pandemic occurs and influenza vaccine is unavailable. Antiviral
drugs, which can be used against all strains of influenza, have been as
effective as vaccines in preventing illness from influenza and have the
advantage of being available now. HHS assumes shortages will occur in a
pandemic because demand is expected to exceed current rates ofPage 4 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
production and increasing production capacity of antiviral drugs can take
at least 6 to 9 months, according to manufacturers. HHS is studying the
feasibility of stockpiling these drugs to preclude shortages. Among people
who become ill with influenza, prior immunization against pneumococcal
pneumonia, an infection that frequently follows influenza, may help reduce
the number of deaths or the severity of illness. Shortages of this vaccine are
also expected during a pandemic because only about an estimated 7 million
doses of vaccine are produced each year as most of the population is not
targeted to receive the vaccine. Increasing immunization rates now,
particularly among high-risk groups, has been suggested by HHS as the
primary strategy to mitigate shortages in a pandemic because the vaccine
provides immunity for at least 5 to 10 years.
Federal and state influenza pandemic plans are in various stages of
completion and do not completely or consistently address key issues
surrounding the purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines and
antiviral drugs. HHS is working on a national plan, 10 states either have
developed or are developing plans using general guidance from CDC, and
19 more states have plans under development. Outstanding issues remain,
however, because certain key federal decisions have not been made. For
example, HHS has not determined the proportion of vaccines and antiviral
drugs to be purchased, distributed, and administered by the public and
private sectors or established priorities for which population groups should
receive vaccines and antiviral drugs first when supplies are limited. As a
result, policies may differ among states and between states and the federal
government, and in the event of a pandemic these inconsistencies could
contribute to public confusion and weaken the effectiveness of the public
health response. To improve the nation’s ability to respond to an influenza
pandemic, we are recommending that HHS determine the capability of the
private and public sectors to produce, distribute, and administer vaccines
and drugs and complete the national response plan. In commenting on a
draft of this report, HHS generally concurred with our recommendations.
Background In almost every year an influenza virus causes acute respiratory disease in
epidemic proportions somewhere in the world. Influenza—also called “the
flu”—is more severe than some of the other viral respiratory infections,
such as the common cold. Most people who get the flu recover completely
in 1 to 2 weeks, but some develop serious and potentially life-threatening
medical complications, such as pneumonia. People who are age 65 or over
or who have severe chronic conditions are much more likely to develop
serious complications than are younger, healthier people. In an average fluPage 5 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
season (winter months), influenza contributes to as many as 20,000 deaths
and 114,000 hospitalizations in the United States.
Occasionally, worldwide influenza epidemics—called pandemics—occur
that can have successive “waves” of disease and last for up to 3 years.
Documented accounts of such pandemics cover the past 300 years, with
three occurring in the 20th century. Notable among these was the pandemic
of 1918—called the “Spanish flu”—which killed at least 20 million people
worldwide, including 500,000 in the United States. For reasons still not
completely understood, many of the fatalities during the 1918 pandemic
were young adults, and many people reportedly died within hours after the
first symptoms appeared. The pandemics of 1957 (“Asian flu”) and 1968
(“Hong Kong flu”) caused dramatically fewer fatalities—70,000 and 34,000,
respectively, in the United States—primarily because of antibiotic
treatment of secondary infections and more aggressive supportive care.1
Nevertheless, both were associated with high fatality rates and social
disruption resulting from high absenteeism among providers of health care
and other essential community services such as police and firefighters.
The characteristics of influenza viruses make the disease difficult to
control, and its eradication is not a realistic expectation. Influenza viruses
undergo minor but continuous genetic changes from year to year.2
Periodically, but unpredictably, an influenza virus changes so significantly
that any immunity conferred by previous vaccinations or infections is not
effective, creating the potential for a pandemic. The dramatic genetic
changes that produce variants responsible for widespread illness and
death, such as those that caused the 1957 and 1968 pandemics, probably
involve the mixing of two strains in a single host. For example, strains of
the influenza virus that are found in birds can mix with strains found in
other host animals, such as pigs, to produce a new, and possibly virulent,
strain that infects people. In 1997 a second—never before seen—method
for dramatic change was revealed when an avian influenza virus not
previously known to infect people directly infected humans without an
intermediate host. The virus killed 6 of the 18 people in Hong Kong who
became ill. Although the disease did not readily spread among humans, had
it acquired the ability to do so, it might have become very difficult to
1The names reflect popular impressions of where the pandemics began, although many
experts believe all three originated in China.
2Variants of the influenza B virus and all subtypes of A evolve separately, have distinct
characteristics, and may respond differently to vaccine.Page 6 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
control. Because new influenza viruses will continue to emerge, many
experts believe another pandemic is inevitable.
Public health experts and state and federal officials view influenza vaccine
as the cornerstone of efforts to prevent and control annual epidemic
influenza as well as pandemic influenza. Deciding which viral strains to
include in the annual influenza vaccine depends on data collected from
domestic and international surveillance systems that identify prevalent
strains and characterize their effect on human health. In the United States,
CDC monitors data on the disease and the virus from surveillance that
occurs in all 50 states and the District of Columbia year-round but with
intensified efforts during the October through May flu season. Domestic
surveillance consists of test data from 138 laboratories that receive
specimens year-round, mortality data from 122 cities that account for about
one-third of all deaths, and weekly reports from about 400 physicians and
state epidemiologists regarding the extent and intensity of influenza illness.
In addition, CDC participates in international disease and laboratory
surveillance sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO), which
operates in 83 countries.
Officials at HHS, WHO, and state public health agencies have begun to
develop strategies to reduce influenza-related illness, death, economic loss,
and social disruption, such as the closure of schools and hospitals and
decreased access to utilities and other essential services. In many cases,
state and federal officials are integrating these strategies with response
plans for such public health emergencies as natural disasters and
bioterrorist events. However, unlike many natural disasters, which often
have fairly localized effects, an influenza pandemic is likely to affect many
locations simultaneously. This widespread nature may preclude the ability
to shift human and material resources from unaffected areas to locations in
great need, a possibility that heightens the importance of planning during
the prepandemic period.
Vaccine Availability
May Be Limited in a
Pandemic
Vaccines are considered the first line of defense against influenza to
prevent infection and control the spread of the disease. The ability to
successfully use vaccines to prevent influenza-related illness and death
during the first wave of a pandemic, however, relies on certain conditions
that have not been realized in the past, and may not occur in the future.
Problems experienced in past influenza pandemics include the inability to
produce a sufficient quantity of vaccine before outbreaks occur in the
United States and variations in the extent to which the manufacturedPage 7 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic




Annual influenza vaccine production is a complex process involving
vaccine manufacturers, health care experts, and federal agencies, primarily
the FDA. The process, which involves growing the virus for vaccine in
fertilized chicken eggs, requires several steps, generally taking at least 6 to
8 months between about January and August each year, as shown in table 1.
Administering the vaccine to the population is estimated to take an
additional 1 to 2 months, or even longer if a second dose of vaccine is
required. After inoculation, it takes about 2 weeks for adults and up to 6
weeks for children to achieve optimal protection under a one-dose
regimen, with an additional 4 weeks if a booster shot is needed a month
later.
Table 1: Annual Vaccine Production Process
aReagents are substances that laboratories use to help identify or measure other substances.
bNumbers higher than total because some steps overlap.
Production step Responsible entity Time
Develop reference virus strain for
production
FDA 4 - 10 weeks
Manufacture test strains Vaccine manufacturers 2 - 4 weeks
Develop potency test reagentsa FDA 10 - 12 weeks
Manufacture and test vaccine Vaccine manufacturers/FDA 10 - 12 weeks
Total production time 6 -
- -
- 8 monthsbPage 8 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
Annual production capacity for vaccine is about 80 million doses per year,
which FDA officials and vaccine manufacturers agree can be expanded to
produce vaccine for the entire U.S. population under certain conditions.3
However, these conditions were not realized during the pandemics of 1957
and 1968, when immunization efforts failed to have any perceptible effect
because too little vaccine was administered too late. HHS officials and
vaccine manufacturers agree that because of the complexity of the vaccine
production cycle, problems are also likely to occur in a future pandemic.
Several factors can hinder timely vaccine production, including (1) the
speed of production compared to the speed at which the virus infects a
population, and (2) how well the virus can be replicated for mass
production.
Problems Related to Speed of
Vaccine Production Compared to
Speed of Infection of Population
While the global influenza surveillance system provides valuable
information for deciding which viral strains to include in the annual
influenza vaccine, limits on the speed with which vaccines can be produced
may hinder pandemic response capability. Because people lack immunity
to a pandemic strain and such a virus may be more virulent, pandemic
strains may spread more quickly. Experts involved in monitoring the
identification and spread of influenza viruses estimate that a pandemic
strain originating in a foreign country could arrive in the United States
sooner than vaccine could be produced. FDA officials and vaccine
manufacturers told us that production of influenza vaccine cannot be
shortened to less than the current 6 to 8 months given the existing
technology and safety standards. However, as table 2 shows, past
pandemics and new strains that might have heralded a pandemic have
generally spread to the United States in less time.
3The time required to produce vaccines depends, in part, on the number of viral strains in
the vaccine, satisfactory growth and yield of the virus in chicken eggs, the number of doses
required to build immunity, and access to raw materials. All other things being equal,
vaccines that include a single strain can be produced in less time and in greater quantities
than vaccines containing multiple strains because no additional time is needed to produce
and combine additional strains. For example, current production capacity is about 80
million doses of a vaccine containing three viral strains; the same capacity could produce
about 240 million doses of a vaccine containing a single virus in less time. Other factors that
affect timing include testing by FDA and manufacturers to determine vaccine potency and
the development of a standardized serum used for such testing.Page 9 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
Table 2: Months for Newly Detected Influenza Viruses to Reach the United States
aIt is unknown whether the virus originated in the United States, China, or Europe. Some researchers
suggest that the virus began circulating in midwestern U.S. military camps.
NIH is developing a library of reagents of all strains known to circulate
among animals that has the potential to shorten the time required to
identify a new virus.4 More rapid identification could help reduce the time
needed to produce an effective vaccine should these strains appear in
humans. However, more rapid production would not ensure that sufficient
vaccine would be available before the first wave of influenza outbreak
occurs, especially if the pandemic originates in the United States. Even
assuming that the next pandemic originates outside of the United States,
experts estimate the warning time prior to reaching U.S. soil may range
from about 1 to 6 months. NIH5 and others are sponsoring research to
develop new types of vaccines, but an all-purpose vaccine effective against
a broad spectrum of influenza strains that could be produced in advance of
a pandemic has not materialized.






Spanish flu, 1918 United Statesa 0a
Asian flu, 1957 Republic of China 4- 5
Hong Kong flu, 1968 Hong Kong 2- 3
Year new strains detected
Swine flu, 1976 United States 0
Russian flu, 1977 Russia 3- 4
Chicken flu, 1997 Hong Kong Did not reach
United States
4Reagents in this context are materials such as antibodies and purified proteins that are
used by laboratories to measure vaccine potency and identify new influenza viruses.
5NIH support for influenza research related to basic biology, immunology, epidemiology,
vaccine and drug development, and evaluation totaled over $10 million in fiscal year 1999.Page 10 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
The inflexibility of the vaccine production cycle also could contribute to
delays in the availability of an influenza vaccine. To help ensure that
vaccines are ready to be distributed in time for the flu season each fall,
annual influenza vaccine production in the United States routinely occurs
earlier in the year, from January through August.6 Because no market exists
for vaccine after this period, manufacturers switch their capacity to other
uses between about mid-August and December. This annual vaccine
production cycle may not coincide with the timing needed to respond to an
outbreak of a new influenza strain. For example, in July 1997, public health
officials at CDC determined on the basis of surveillance data from Australia
that a new influenza strain was circulating and would be likely to cause
widespread illness in the United States during the upcoming flu season. But
by July, vaccine production was almost complete, and the new strain could
not be added. As a result, the vaccine for the 1997-98 flu season in the
United States was, according to CDC reports, less effective in preventing
influenza illness than in previous years. As table 3 shows, other pandemic
and newly detected virus strains have also been identified after the annual
vaccine production cycle had begun.
Table 3: Time of Year Influenza Illness Appeared
aEstimates range from spring to early summer.
Manufacturers say they are willing to maintain year-round production
capacity should the government wish to fund the necessary costs of
maintaining unused capacity during nonpandemic periods. To date, HHS
6In addition, approximately 6 months before vaccine production begins manufacturers must
place their orders for new chicken flocks to support egg production.
Strain and year Month appeared
Pandemic strain
Spanish flu, 1918 Marcha
Asian flu, 1957 April
Hong Kong flu, 1968 July
New strains with limited effect
Swine flu, 1976 February
Russian flu, 1977 November
Chicken flu, 1997 AugustPage 11 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
has not developed contingency plans for expanded capacity or analyzed
whether government funding to maintain ongoing manufacturer capacity is
feasible or desirable. Such an analysis would need to consider other
potential production problems that may further preclude vaccine
availability.
Problems Related to Mass
Production of Vaccine
One potential production problem is that influenza strains differ in how
well they can be mass-produced for vaccine, which may negatively affect
the quantity of vaccine that can be produced in a given year. To create a
vaccine, manufacturers first receive the reference strain of virus from FDA.
This reference, or “seed,” virus is generally made up of bits of the selected
influenza virus that have been combined with another influenza virus that
grows more quickly. Manufacturers then mass-produce this “high-growth-
reassorted” virus in fertilized chicken eggs and harvest it to make the
vaccine. Problems have occurred when a particular virus strain either
cannot be grown in eggs or grows too slowly. For example, the strain
identified in Hong Kong in 1997 was an avian strain that killed chick
embryos, a factor that complicated U.S. production of a vaccine. More
recently, difficulties replicating and processing one strain included in the
vaccine for the 2000-01 influenza season have contributed to lower-than-
anticipated production yields and delays in distributing vaccine supplies.
To address this problem, manufacturers and others are studying the
feasibility of switching from an egg-based to a tissue-based production
method, but the latter method has not been licensed by FDA and the overall
benefits are not clear. For example, while some avian strains of influenza
may grow more readily in tissue than in chicken eggs, others may not.
Alternative attempts to grow the 1997 Hong Kong virus in cell substrates
other than eggs were, in some cases, more successful than egg-based
methods, but difficulties still hindered mass vaccine production. Some
manufacturers told us that the cost of switching production methods may
not be worth the investment because tissue-based production may result in
lower yields of vaccine. For example, one manufacturer said that growing
the virus in tissue takes approximately 5 days, while growing the virus in
eggs takes 11 days, saving less than 1 week in the total production cycle.
New technology based on a DNA vaccine may resolve these production
problems, while reducing production time. However, researchers estimate
it will be at least 5 to 10 years before this technology is available for vaccine
production.Page 12 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
Problems Related to
Vaccine Effectiveness
Vaccinating the entire U.S. population does not guarantee everyone will be
protected from influenza-related illness and death. Information regarding
the extent to which vaccines have been effective in preventing influenza is
limited, but available studies indicate vaccine effectiveness may vary
significantly from year to year based on both vaccine-related factors and
the demographics of the population receiving the vaccine. For example,
vaccine preparation, dosage, and the degree to which the vaccine matches
the virus circulating in the community all affect vaccine effectiveness.
Demographic factors that influence how well each person’s immune system
responds to the vaccine generally include the person’s age and extent of
underlying chronic illness or disease.
Although up to about 80 million doses of vaccine are administered each
year, no regular program exists to determine how effectively the vaccine
performs. While HHS officials told us they see some effect from
vaccination coverage, other experts point to national data trends that have
not shown a clear correlation between changes in influenza-related illness
and death relative to changes in the proportion of the population
vaccinated.7 Using data sets from managed care organizations, CDC
intends to continue retrospective studies of vaccine effectiveness to better
determine how well vaccine prevents influenza or mitigates its severity in
various populations.
In the meantime, information on vaccine effectiveness is generally limited
to small studies of primarily vaccinated populations. These studies have
shown that when the vaccine generates a good antibody response to the
circulating virus, influenza vaccine may prevent illness in approximately 70
to 90 percent of healthy persons under 65 years of age. However, vaccine
effectiveness drops sharply for the elderly and people with chronic illness,
who are considered most vulnerable to influenza-related illness and death.8
For example, studies have shown influenza vaccine may be about 30 to 70
percent effective in reducing hospitalization among the
noninstitutionalized elderly population. Overall effectiveness in preventing
influenza among the elderly has been even lower, often ranging from 30 to
7One difficulty in comparing effectiveness across years is the growing number of persons
who are at high risk for serious complications. As more people age and more survive with
immune-compromising diseases, this high-risk group will continue to grow.
8According to CDC, about 90 percent of influenza-related deaths occur among people aged
65 and older, with most other deaths occurring in people suffering from underlying disease.Page 13 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
40 percent. Approaches to improve the effectiveness of the influenza
vaccines include conducting research to develop alternative methods of
administering existing vaccines and new vaccines such as weakened live
virus vaccine or DNA vaccines that, in theory, may produce broader and
longer-lasting protective immune responses.
Antiviral Drugs and
Pneumococcal Vaccine
May Be in Limited
Supply During a
Pandemic
Antiviral drugs and vaccine against pneumonia are two additional
measures that can help prevent or mitigate influenza-related illness and
death until an influenza vaccine becomes available. However, both are
expected to be in short supply during a pandemic, and increasing
production capacity for antiviral drugs and vaccine in response to
increased demand could take at least 6 to 9 months. Creating a stockpile of
antiviral drugs is an option to mitigate shortages during a pandemic.
However, HHS officials told us that additional analysis is needed to
determine the feasibility and desirability of such an effort. One option to
minimize shortages of pneumococcal vaccine during a pandemic is to
immunize the population now against possible future infection. However,
immunization rates for elderly and high-risk groups remain below
established targets, and immunization recommendations have not been
expanded to include healthy children and young adults because they are at




Antiviral drugs can be used against all strains of pandemic influenza and
have immediate availability both as a prophylactic to prevent illness and as
a treatment if administered within 48 hours of the onset of symptoms.
Studies of these drugs have shown them to be as effective as vaccines in
preventing influenza infection in healthy young adults if taken under the
prescribed regimen,9 and, when used for treatment, to shorten the duration
and severity of infection.10
Twelve manufacturers produce antiviral drugs approved by FDA for use
against influenza in the United States. These drugs vary in both their costs
and their benefits, as shown in table 4. For example, the older and less
expensive drugs amantadine and rimantadine have been approved for
prophylaxis of all age groups against the influenza virus strains most likely
to cause a pandemic. However, their side effects, particularly those of
amantadine, include central nervous system disturbances, such as delirium
or behavioral changes, that may preclude their use in certain populations.11
The newer and more expensive drugs, zanamivir and oseltamivir, have a
lower incidence of side effects and are effective against a broader range of
virus strains. However, as of August 2000 they had FDA approval only for
treatment, not prevention. In addition, they have not been approved for use
in younger age groups, and zanamivir is not recommended for certain other
segments of the population.12 None of the antiviral drugs have been studied
extensively for long-term use or in large populations.
9As with vaccine, in studies of healthy young adults antiviral drugs were generally 70 to 90
percent effective in preventing influenza. For the two antiviral drugs approved for
preventing influenza, the standard adult dosage is 200 milligrams (mg) per day, taken as two
100-mg tablets or 4 teaspoonfuls of syrup until approximately 1 week after the end of the
outbreak.
10CDC evaluations have shown antiviral drugs shorten the duration of influenza by about 1
day, with some reduction of severity and prevention of secondary infections.
11These more severe side effects have been associated with high plasma drug concentrations
and observed most often among persons who have renal insufficiency, seizure disorders, or
certain psychiatric disorders and among elderly persons taking amantadine as prophylaxis
at a dose of 200 mg/day.
12Special caution is advised in using zanamivir in patients with underlying asthma or chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease because FDA has received several reports of deterioration of
respiratory function following its use.Page 15 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
Table 4: Antiviral Drugs Approved for Influenza by FDA
aCost to federal government based on lowest prices in the federal supply schedule.
bCost varies from $0.10 to $0.27 for generic tablets and $1.06 to $1.10 for brand name tablets. Cost
varies from $0.52 to $1.46 for generic syrups and is $2.26 for brand name syrup.
cRimantadine is approved only for prophylaxis in children; however, CDC reports that many experts
also consider rimantadine appropriate for treatment in children.
dCost is for rimantadine tablets. Cost for rimantadine syrup is $1.37.
CDC historically has supported use of antiviral drugs during nonpandemic
periods as an adjunct to vaccine to prevent influenza among high-risk
populations in certain circumstances. Antiviral drugs may be used (1) when
influenza vaccine is unavailable, (2) during the 2 to 6 weeks after
inoculation until the vaccine becomes effective, and (3) for people who
cannot tolerate the vaccine because of allergies or other factors. However,
CDC cautions against the use of antiviral drugs in the face of the vaccine
shortages expected for the 2000-01 influenza season. CDC states that even
if a vaccine shortage develops, it does not support routine and widespread
use of antiviral drugs to prevent influenza, because it is an untested and
expensive strategy that could result in large numbers of persons
experiencing adverse effects.
While shortages of antiviral drugs have not been a problem in the past, HHS
officials expect the amount produced will be well below demand during a
pandemic. This assumption, supported by drug manufacturers, is based on
the fact that current production levels of antiviral drugs are set in response
to current demand, whereas demand in a pandemic is expected to increase
significantly if vaccines are unavailable as a means to prevent the disease.
Manufacturers told us that expanding supply to meet increased demand is
possible to some extent but that the lead time required to produce at least
one type of antiviral drug can be at least 6 to 9 months. Manufacturers say
that knowing how much drug CDC expects them to produce for a pandemic
would assist them in determining whether their existing surge capacity is












Amantadine 1976 Prophylaxis and
treatment
All A strains Adults and children 9 $0.10b
Rimantadine 1993 Prophylaxis and
treatment
All A strains Adults and
childrenc
1 $1.07d
Zanamivir 1999 Treatment only All A and B strains 7 years and older 1 $5.38
Oseltamivir 1999 Treatment only All A and B strains 18 years and older 1 $6.49Page 16 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
plans to expand capacity even further. Both FDA and CDC started
collecting data on the production capacity of antiviral drug manufacturers
in May and June 2000, but data collection efforts remain incomplete. HHS
has not developed contingency plans with manufacturers to expand
production capacity or analyzed whether government funding to maintain
ongoing manufacturer capacity is feasible or desirable. In the absence of
federal decisions about drug availability and use, state officials are
uncertain whether or to what extent they should include strategies that rely
on antiviral drugs to prevent or treat infection until vaccine becomes
available.13 HHS officials plan to convene an expert panel to determine how
antiviral drugs should be used in the event of a pandemic or in the face of
vaccine shortages.
Creating a stockpile is another option to ensure availability of antiviral
drugs for a pandemic. HHS has not formally evaluated whether creating a
stockpile to preclude shortages is warranted and feasible.14 CDC officials
have noted several factors that must be addressed in deciding to create a
stockpile. For example, officials need to determine whether to build or rent
storage facilities and where to locate them, develop a distribution system,
assess the feasibility of rotating stock given the shelf-life of the drug and
current market capacity, and determine how to finance the stockpile. The
recent creation of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile to help prepare
for a bioterrorist attack has provided experience in these areas. This
program, administered by CDC and financed by a federal appropriation of
$51 million in fiscal year 1999 and $52 million in fiscal year 2000,15
maintains a medical stockpile considered to be adequate to respond to a
bioterrorist attack but lacks all the pharmaceuticals, supplies, and
equipment that may be necessary to respond to an influenza pandemic.
Under this program, the Department of Veterans Affairs, as CDC’s agent,
purchases drugs, supplies, and equipment, which are stored as active
13The six state pandemic plans we reviewed do not rely on using antiviral drugs, in part
because supplies are expected to be very limited.
14In deciding whether stockpiling antiviral drugs is feasible, officials managing the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile state that someone must look at the outcome or value-benefit of
the costs involved, which would include the projected lives saved as well as overall
decrease in illness and economic damage. For example, the overall costs of a prevention
program for influenza may be matched against CDC estimates that, if no action is taken in a
moderately severe pandemic, up to 207,000 people could die, 90 million could become ill,
and economic damages could total $167 billion.
15The HHS budget proposal for fiscal year 2001 includes $54 million to continue
development of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.Page 17 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
inventory in vendor warehouses. In developing the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile, CDC relied in part on our recent review of two
other federally maintained stockpiles to assess management oversight of
items in the stockpile.16
Use and Availability of
Pneumococcal Vaccine
Inoculation with pneumococcal vaccine, which helps protect against
pneumococcal pneumonia, a type of pneumonia that frequently follows
influenza infection, may help reduce a substantial number of influenza-
related deaths.17 Depending on the severity with which the disease attacks
different population groups, available vaccine supplies might be needed to
help protect groups other than those typically considered at risk, such as
young adults. Although national mortality statistics have directly attributed
about 1,000 deaths per year to influenza during the last decade, CDC
attributes at least 20,000 more deaths per year to secondary infections of
influenza, such as pneumonia.18 As shown in table 5, the numbers of deaths
over and above these annual estimates of influenza-related deaths—called
excess deaths19—have generally been even higher during pandemics,
especially during the pandemic of 1918, when antibiotics and advanced
medical care to treat secondary infections were unavailable.
16Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed
(HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 29, 1999).
17Pneumococcal vaccine provides protection against pneumococcal pneumonia, especially
when other pneumococcal infections such as bacterial meningitis and infection of the
bloodstream are present.
18Influenza by itself is not generally regarded as a fatal disease, but as a debilitating infection
that prepares the way for a secondary invader. Historically, the most frequent complication
has been pneumonia. Over the years an increasing proportion of excess deaths have been
attributed to other causes, primarily chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
19The hallmark of pandemic influenza has been excess mortality, defined in 1847 by William
Farr in London, England, as the number of deaths observed during an epidemic of influenza-
like illness in excess of the number expected.Page 18 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
Table 5: Excess Influenza-Related Deaths Estimated for Pandemic and
Nonpandemic Periods in the United States, 1918-91
aEstimated.
Source: W. Paul Glezen, “Emerging Infections: Pandemic Influenza,” Epidemiologic Reviews, Vol. 18,
No. 1 (1996), pp. 64-76.
CDC officials generally attribute about one-third of the excess deaths each
year to influenza-related pneumonia, and most of these deaths are
attributed to a type of bacterial pneumonia that may be prevented with the
pneumococcal vaccine. The exact number of deaths caused by
pneumococcal pneumonia is unknown,20 but HHS reports that at least in
some epidemics, the disease has been responsible for up to half of
influenza-related deaths. Because pneumococcal vaccine provides
immunity for at least 5 to 10 years, it can provide benefit during
nonpandemic as well as pandemic years. CDC reports that during
nonpandemic periods, the populations most at risk for hospitalization and
death due to pneumococcal disease include approximately 35 million
persons aged 65 or older and approximately 33 to 39 million persons of all
ages with chronic illness. Therefore, CDC recommends that pneumococcal







Pandemic 1918-20 225,000 218.4
Nonpandemic 1920-33 28,338 23.0
Nonpandemic 1933-57 10,108 7.5
Pandemic 1957-60 38,567 22.0
Nonpandemic 1960-68 14,363 7.5
Pandemic 1968-72 27,982 13.9
Nonpandemic 1972-81 22,089 10.3
Nonpandemica 1981-91 20,000 10.0
20The precise incidence of pneumococcal pneumonia is difficult to determine because
routine diagnostic tests are insufficiently specific and sensitive. Nonetheless, CDC estimates
that up to 175,000 hospitalizations for pneumococcal pneumonia occur in the United States
each year and up to 12,500 deaths, accounting for more deaths than any other vaccine-
preventable bacterial disease. Approximately half of these deaths potentially could be
prevented through use of vaccine, according to CDC.Page 19 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
CDC officials expect shortages of pneumococcal vaccine during a
pandemic because only about 7 to 9 million doses are currently produced
each year,21 the vaccine production process takes about 8 to 9 months, and
current overall immunization rates remain below target. CDC officials say
that manufacturers produce vaccine according to the current demand for
the product. Therefore, increasing the extent that the population is
currently immunized would help preclude shortages of vaccine during a
pandemic, not only by increasing production capacity, but also by reducing
the number of people that remain to be immunized.
In 1995 we reviewed the efforts of HHS to improve pneumococcal
vaccination rates for adults aged 65 and older.22 As part of its response,
CDC and other HHS agencies developed the Adult Immunization Action
Plan, which focused efforts on raising awareness of the importance of the
vaccine among clinicians, public health professionals, and the public.
Specific steps include encouraging (1) health care provider organizations
to revise current immunization policies and include directives clinicians
can use in their practices to increase immunization, particularly among
high-risk groups, and (2) accrediting organizations to urge requiring
hospitals and other care facilities to adopt directives aimed at immunizing
high-risk individuals. In addition, CDC has developed and disseminated
brochures and other educational material for the public and health care
providers that stress the health benefits of vaccination.
Since CDC initiated these actions, immunization rates have increased,
particularly for adults aged 65 and older. As of 1997, 43 percent of people
aged 65 and older and 11 percent of younger at-risk populations have been
immunized with pneumococcal vaccine. Preliminary data from 1999
indicate that the rate for those aged 65 and older has increased further to 54
percent. Despite this progress, rates remain below the HHS year 2000 goal
of 60 percent for each of these noninstitutionalized populations. Moreover,
the year 2010 goal for people aged 65 and older increases to 90 percent,
well above the current goal. CDC officials cite the continued lack of
awareness about the availability and importance of pneumococcal vaccine
21There are two manufacturers of the pneumococcal vaccine for the United States, and CDC
officials state that the vaccine has a shelf-life of 2 years.
22Immunization: HHS Could Do More to Increase Vaccination Among Older Adults
(GAO/PEMD-95-14, June 8, 1995).Page 20 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
as the primary barrier to increasing immunization rates.23 Officials from all
but one of the 11 states we contacted planned to expand existing programs
to increase nonpandemic use of pneumococcal vaccines by such means as
raising awareness among physicians and public health officials and
educating the public.
Shortages of pneumococcal vaccine could also be exacerbated by the fact
that there may be a high need for it among people under age 65 as well as
for the older population. For example, in the 1918 pandemic the influenza-
related death rate for young adults was more than 3 times that for people
over age 65, just the opposite of the situation in nonpandemic years, when
the influenza-related death rates for those over age 65 were 8 to 15 times
greater than those for younger people. Of the estimated 550,000 excess
deaths for all age groups in the years 1918 and 1919, over 280,000
pneumonia deaths were reported in young adults, aged 20 to 39 years. Since
1980, those under 65 have generally accounted for less than 10 percent of
the influenza-related excess deaths. However, CDC officials have estimated
that in a future pandemic up to 50 percent of deaths may fall within the age
group of 0 to 64 years. CDC has not estimated the number of deaths that
may be prevented with pneumococcal vaccine. According to CDC officials,
current recommendations for pneumococcal vaccine are unlikely to be
expanded to include healthy young adults because pandemic scenarios are





Federal and state pandemic response plans are in various stages of
completion and do not completely or consistently address the problems
related to the purchase, distribution, and administration of supplies of
vaccines and antiviral drugs during a pandemic. HHS has provided interim
draft guidance to facilitate state plans, but final federal decisions necessary
to mitigate the effects of potential shortages have not been made.24 Until
such decisions are made, the timeliness and adequacy of response efforts
may be compromised.
23A recent report by the Institute of Medicine notes that without a renewal and strengthening
of the state and federal immunization financial and policy partnership, gains in
immunization rates can be expected to decline (Institute of Medicine, Calling the Shots:
Immunization Finance, Policy, and Practices (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
June 2000)).
24CDC’s draft interim guidance notes that it has not been officially approved or endorsed but
is intended to guide state planning efforts until national planning efforts are completed.Page 21 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
Status of Federal and State
Pandemic Response Plans
The federal government developed the first national pandemic plan in 1978,
after the threat of a pandemic swine flu in 1976 clearly demonstrated the
need for advance planning to support a mass immunization and response
effort within the United States. Lessons learned from that experience,
which was the government’s first attempt at immunization of the entire U.S.
population, included the need for the federal government to reach
agreements with private and public sector entities responsible for the
timely purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines and drugs.25
More recent experience with vaccine shortages also demonstrated the need
for federal guidance in distributing limited quantities of vaccines and drugs
to priority groups within the population. In 1993 the federal government
convened a panel of experts from the public and private sectors to review
and revise the pandemic response plan. As of October 2000, HHS officials
directing the planning effort had not set a date to complete and distribute a
revised national plan.
To foster state and local pandemic planning and preparedness, CDC first
issued interim planning guidance in draft form to all states in 1997,
outlining general federal and state planning responsibilities. As of
September 2000, 28 states were actively preparing a pandemic plan, 10
states characterized their planning efforts as in the conceptual stage, and 1
state did not comment on the stage of planning efforts, according to a
recent survey by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists.26 The
remaining 11 responding officials said their states were not engaged in
pandemic planning. Beginning in 1999, HHS funded 9 states with up to
$13,000 each to develop plans.27 An additional 19 states were developing
plans using other federal and state resources.28
25A summary of the response effort to address the 1976 swine flu and associated problems is
discussed in The Swine Flu Program: An Unprecedented Venture in Preventive Medicine
(GAO/HRD-77-115, June 27, 1977).
26In May 2000, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists surveyed all 50 states and
the District of Columbia about their planning efforts. By September 2000, they had received
50 responses. For purposes of this report, the District of Columbia is referred to as a state.
27Four states—California, Maryland, Minnesota, and South Carolina—produced draft plans
in April 2000, with the remaining five—Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and New Jersey—to complete plans in April 2001.
28CDC has also provided more general assistance in terms of funding and technical
assistance to enhance public health epidemiologic, laboratory, and communications
capacity more generally.Page 22 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
Officials from 32 states said that influenza plans will be integrated with
existing state plans to respond to natural or man-made disasters, such as
flood or bioterrorist attack. Although to a certain extent planning efforts
for other emergencies can be used for pandemic response, additional
planning is important to deal with the specific aspects of pandemic
response. This includes developing plans to address the wide-scale
emergency needs of an entire population, including mass distribution and
administration of limited vaccines and drugs with an uncertain amount of
available resources. State officials say that CDC’s financial and technical
assistance has greatly helped in these planning efforts.
Federal Government
Planning Responsibilities
In the most recent version of its planning guidance for states, CDC lists
several key federal decisions related to vaccines and antiviral drugs that
have not been made. These decisions include determining the amount of
vaccines and drugs that will be purchased at the federal level; the division
of responsibility between the public and private sectors for the purchase,
distribution, and administration of vaccines and drugs; and how population
groups will be prioritized and targeted to receive limited supplies of
vaccines and drugs. In each of these areas, until federal decisions are made,
states will not be able to develop strategies consistent with federal action.
Incomplete Plans for Purchase,
Distribution, and Administration
of Vaccines and Antiviral Drugs
HHS has indicated in its interim planning guidance that how vaccines and
drugs will be purchased, distributed, and administered by the private and
public sectors will change during a pandemic, but some decisions
necessary to prepare for these expected changes have not been made.
During a typical annual influenza response, influenza and pneumococcal
vaccines are purchased through a combination of public and private sector
funds. Vaccine and antiviral drug distribution is primarily handled directly
by manufacturers through private vendors and pharmacies. About 90
percent of vaccines and antiviral drugs are administered or prescribed to
the population on a first-come, first-served basis by private physicians,
nurses, and other health care providers, with most states and counties
participating to a relatively small extent through publicly funded programs.
During a pandemic, however, HHS draft interim guidance indicates that
many of these private sector responsibilities may be transferred to the
public sector at the federal, state, or local level, and priority groups within
the population should be established for receiving limited supplies of
vaccines and drugs. For example, the draft interim guidance for state
pandemic plans says that resources can be expected to be available from
the national level for federal contracts to purchase influenza vaccine and atPage 23 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
least some antiviral agents, but some state funding may be required. In
addition, federal grants or reimbursement for public sector vaccine
distribution and administration may be provided to states, but the draft
interim guidance contains no recommendations on how the level and
nature of such resources might differ in response to the severity of the
pandemic.
Professional organizations representing vaccine manufacturers and
pharmacists have questioned the necessity of moving responsibility for
distribution and administration to the public sector during a pandemic.
According to these organizations, existing private systems are in place and
can operate more smoothly in response to federal direction than an as-yet-
to-be-defined public sector system. At least one professional organization
has contacted CDC requesting to assist the federal government in
expanding capacity for private sector vaccine administration. HHS has not
determined the extent to which federal funding will be made available or
developed more guidance for states to use in planning how to use public
and private sector resources to distribute and administer vaccines and
antiviral drugs. In the absence of decisions regarding the extent of federal
responsibility and investment in pandemic response, however, state
officials are uncertain of how much state funding will be required and what
level of state response can be supported. Two say that without more detail
and commitment on federal assistance they plan to respond to the
pandemic using state resources alone.
Incomplete Plans for Prioritizing
Population Groups for Limited
Distribution of Vaccines and
Drugs
State officials are particularly concerned that a national plan has not
finalized recommendations for how population groups should be
prioritized to receive vaccines and antiviral drugs. In its most recent (1999)
interim draft guidance sent to states, HHS lists eight different population
groups that should be considered in establishing priorities among groups
for receiving vaccines and drugs during a pandemic. The list includes such
groups as health care workers and public health personnel involved in the
pandemic response, persons traditionally considered to be at increased
risk of severe influenza illness and mortality, and preschool and school-
aged children.
The interim guidance states that recommendations on the relative priority
of each group are still under study and will be based on a number of
factors, including the need to maintain community pandemic response
capability. Other factors include limiting mortality among high-risk groups,
reducing mortality in the general population, and minimizing social
disruption and economic losses. HHS officials say they are still committedPage 24 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
to publishing recommendations on the relative priority for each population
group. However, the recommendations need to be flexible to recognize the
different situations that could emerge. For example, officials point out that
the severity with which the pandemic attacks specific population groups
would have to be taken into consideration in setting priorities.
State officials acknowledge the need for flexibility in planning because
many aspects of a pandemic cannot be known in advance. However, these
officials say that the absence of more detail regarding how and when
federal recommendations will be made leaves them uncertain about how to
plan for the use of limited supplies of vaccine and drugs. For example,
knowing federal government recommendations under different conditions
allows states to better estimate the extent to which priority groups can be
vaccinated, to develop strategies to target those groups, and to determine
the number of additional personnel and locations that will be needed for
vaccine and drug administration.
Another concern, particularly for state officials, is that without federal
decisions to establish priorities for which population groups should receive
the limited quantities of vaccines and drugs, inconsistencies could arise
both among states and between states and the federal government. Several
state officials say such policy differences among states and between states
and the federal government in the use and distribution of vaccines and
antiviral drugs may contribute to public confusion and social disruption, as
shown by recent experience. Specifically, in 1998, after 3 of 11 children who
developed meningitis died, one state initiated a mass vaccination program
for people between the ages of 2 and 22 using a strategy of shared public
and private sector responsibility for administering the vaccine.29
Surrounding states that did not have an increase in reported cases did not
initiate similar programs or recommend vaccination for everyone in this
age group. The differences in state recommendations caused some
residents of bordering states to seek immunization for their children by
crossing state lines. The intense media attention and demand for
vaccinations, coupled with a perceived shortage of meningococcal vaccine,
created substantial confusion in some communities as fearful parents
29The federal Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends routine use of
meningococcal vaccine only for certain high-risk individuals in this age group, not the
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overwhelmed private providers with phone calls and office visits,
according to officials responsible for the vaccination program.30
Conclusions While experts consider an influenza pandemic to be inevitable, no one
knows when it will occur or how severe it will be. What is known is that
traditional response strategies for obtaining, using, and distributing
vaccines and drugs during annual influenza epidemics may be insufficient
or inappropriate to control or minimize the effect of pandemic disease,
particularly in its early stages, on the population and the economy.
Although not much can be known about a pandemic viral strain until it
appears, planning a response that relies on vaccines and drugs depends, at
least in part, on knowing the amounts that can be produced and developing
strategies for reaching various populations that might be at risk. Because
influenza vaccine must be tailored specifically to the pandemic strain that
appears, an effective response plan also depends, in part, on the ability to
rapidly identify the strains that are newly infecting people and to produce
influenza vaccine using alternative methods in the event existing ones
cannot be used. Moreover, acting now to increase the extent to which
vulnerable populations, particularly those aged 65 and older, receive
pneumococcal vaccine can help protect them from the complications of
influenza in the event of a pandemic. Despite recent gains in the use of
vaccines, the rate of pneumococcal immunization among high-risk groups
remains below established goals, indicating the need for HHS to maintain
its efforts to raise awareness about the importance of this vaccine.
Stronger federal leadership is needed to analyze alternative strategies to
increase the availability and relative effect of vaccines and drugs among
various populations. Because new strategies may replace familiar response
patterns to address the unique aspects of a pandemic, advance planning is
particularly important to obtain agreement on how the traditional roles and
responsibilities of the public and private sector response effort are likely to
change. Federal leadership, including development of a national plan that
integrates strategies for the use of vaccines and antiviral drugs, is needed
to address national issues as well as help harmonize the various public and
private sector plans.
30To relieve the pressure on private providers, allow them to care for ill patients, and restore
order, this state health department assumed full responsibility for vaccinations and began
an aggressive public communications effort to alleviate public concern. Within 4 weeks,
communities had vaccinated over 90 percent of the targeted population.Page 26 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
Recommendations for
Executive Action
To improve the nation’s ability to respond to the emergence of a pandemic
influenza virus and help ensure an adequate and appropriate level of public
protection, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services take the following actions. First, we recommend that the
Secretary take steps to fill the knowledge gaps in the capability of the
private and public sectors to produce, distribute, and administer vaccines
and antiviral drugs to various population groups to control the spread and
effect of a pandemic. Specifically, we recommend that HHS
• explore and evaluate alternative methods to produce and distribute
influenza vaccine and strategies to help quickly identify newly detected
strains of the influenza virus,
• identify the capability of all manufacturers to produce antiviral drugs
and pneumococcal vaccines and their existing “surge capacity” to
expand production as needed during a pandemic, and
• if existing surge capacity is insufficient, work with manufacturers to
determine the investment and time required to expand production
capacity, or the feasibility of creating a stockpile against projected
shortages.
Second, we recommend that the Secretary establish a deadline for
completing and publishing a federal response plan that will address
• how priorities for receiving limited influenza and pneumococcal
vaccines and antiviral drugs during a pandemic will be established
among population groups, and
• how private and public sector responsibilities might change during a
pandemic for the purchase, use, and distribution of influenza and
pneumococcal vaccines and antiviral drugs.
Agency Comments In commenting on our draft report, HHS agreed that the issues surrounding
the production, purchase, and distribution of vaccines and antiviral drugs
merit continued high priority. It discussed several initiatives under way or
planned. HHS generally concurred with our recommendations. It also
discussed several concerns.
HHS concurred with our recommendation to improve estimates of
manufacturers’ vaccine and antiviral production capacity and to develop
strategies to ensure adequate production levels in the event of a pandemic.
However, HHS commented that it believed the draft report inappropriatelyPage 27 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
emphasized the development and use of antiviral drugs and pneumococcal
vaccine over the use of pandemic influenza vaccine. HHS also stated that
the wording of our recommendation in the draft report to fill knowledge
gaps about vaccines and drugs placed undue and potentially misleading
emphasis on the role of antiviral drugs and pneumococcal vaccines in
pandemic influenza preparedness. We agree with HHS that influenza
vaccine is the first line of defense against an influenza virus, but to the
extent that it is in short supply, antiviral drugs and, to a lesser extent,
pneumococcal vaccine become important interventions. Our
recommendation was intended to include steps to enhance all three
interventions, including the availability of influenza vaccine. We have
expanded the recommendation to include resolving knowledge gaps
surrounding influenza vaccine production and distribution.
In a related comment, HHS stated that the draft did not convey the
appropriate use of pneumococcal vaccine. HHS said that the availability of
the vaccine will not be a major factor of the federal response plan for
pandemic influenza. Rather, it stated that efforts should be directed toward
increasing pneumococcal vaccination rates among high-risk groups before
the health care delivery system is overwhelmed by a pandemic crisis. We
agree that HHS’ strategy has merit and gave it greater prominence in the
final report.
In its general comments HHS stated that the draft report did not address
the full range of activities it considers essential to ensure prepandemic
preparedness and an adequate pandemic response capability. HHS cited as
examples three important aspects of pandemic preparedness that were not
addressed in the report: (1) a robust disease surveillance system, (2) the
presence of community emergency preparedness protocols, and (3) good
public health practices to minimize and control the spread of disease. We
recognize that these factors are important aspects of pandemic
preparedness and response capability. However, our work focused on the
production and distribution of vaccines and drugs, which are also widely
regarded as direct and critical interventions needed to help protect the
population from an influenza pandemic.
HHS concurred with our recommendation to establish a deadline to
complete and publish a federal response plan for pandemic influenza and
stated that it will keep the Congress informed of the proposed timetable
and progress toward the milestones established. HHS also agreed that the
plan needs to include key decisions such as those related to the private and
public sector responsibilities for vaccine purchase and delivery. HHS saidPage 28 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
that it is working to create a flexible plan that will accommodate a wide
variety of contingencies.
HHS’ comments are reprinted in appendix I. It also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents earlier,
we will make no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its
issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Honorable
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Honorable
Jeffrey Koplan, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and
other interested parties. We also will make copies available to others on
request.
This report was prepared by Frank Pasquier, Lacinda Baumgartner, Evan
Stoll, and Cheryl Williams. If you or your staffs have any questions, please
contact me at (202) 512-7119.
Janet Heinrich
Director, Health Care—Public Health IssuesPage 29 GAO-01-4 Influenza Pandemic
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